Abstract-The increasing number of disasters around the world calls for a new direction in building the networks; this direction is known as disaster-resilient networks. In this paper, we consider the effect of post-disaster traffic on the core network performance. We evaluate the network blocking during single node flooding with different flood sizes. Then we study four mitigation approaches to maximally serve the traffic floods using the excess capacity, traffic filtering, rerouting and DifferentiatedServices. The results show that the studied approaches reduce blocking by 50% in the worst cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
The current rapidly growing reliance of society on communication networks in all aspects of life necessitates continuous service availability. This availability could be maintained by building a reliable and resilient network. To maintain this reliability and combat failures, there are two types of connection recovery which are either proactive by deploying backup paths or reactive by reprovisioning the connections dynamically to new paths [1] .
The Boston bombing in 2013 suggested a new issue that might affect the communication networks during disasters which is capacity exhaustion. This issue is relatively different from the previously studied considerations in building disasterresilient networks. In this case the infrastructure is not affected physically but the heavy traffic on the network causes capacity exhaustion. This heavy traffic is a consequence of mobile networks' semi-shutdown [2] and the huge surge of data traffic at the scene.
This problem has been expected to rise since the introduction of the new applications and services that most people tend to use to investigate what is going on during disasters, as indicated in [3] , which shows that two thirds of people use social media during disasters and post-disasters times. In [4] , the authors make a survey to record the user behavior during large size disasters, and they found that 95% of users make phone calls and 76% post information on social media. Added to social media, the news agencies and governmental websites also got attraction through warnings and precautions broadcast. In [5] , the authors show the spark raise in popularity in video traffic in both types; the real time video streaming (TV breaking news) and video streaming (user generated videos) after the Great East Japan Earth Quake and Tsunami.
The backbone of different access networks, including the broadband and cellular one, is the optical core network. The core network is the middleware between the access and the data centers and is responsible for delivering the data between them. In disaster situation, the core should handle this huge traffic in order not to violate the Service Level Agreement (SLA).
The core network capacity can't be upgraded instantaneously, because provisioning new lightpaths requires manual configuration and installing new fibers requires a long period. Alternative reactive solutions should be adopted to accommodate the huge traffic. This solution is known as dynamic networking where the network can reprovision the lightpaths automatically according to the available capacity to accommodate the traffic [6] . Software-Defined Networks (SDN) are considered to be a dynamic networking approach.
In [7, 8] , the authors exploited the excess capacity for new connection pre-provisioning and backup re-provisioning by developing a Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP) and a heuristic. During traffic fluctuation and growth, the algorithm starts free protection resources to be used by newly arrived connection requests, and then starts re-provisioning protection paths with less availability protection schemes. So during disasters as the network suffers from resources degradation, it will be efficient to use such an algorithm to serve more traffic. In our previous work [9] we have investigated reducing blocking probability using traffic scheduling for advance reservation demands. This approach will allow delaying a portion of the floods until the surge passes.
In this paper, we have studied network capacity exhaustion with different post-disaster traffic floods volumes. We have evaluated the network by applying incremental traffic volumes on a single node (a disastrous node) and measure the blocking probability. Also we have studied four approaches to maximize the served traffic and reduce the blocking probability. In the first approach, we suggest using Selective Traffic Filtering approach to filter out less priority traffic during disasters. The second scenario is to reroute backup paths that pass through the flooded node to free flooded node resources, while in the third approach, we suggest to reroute the working and protection paths in the whole network to accommodate more floods. Finally, we suggest using the Differentiated Services (Diff-Serv) approach, where the network should provide protection for high SLA traffic and eliminate protection for low SLA traffic. The network benchmarking had been done for the five scenarios to show how much traffic floods have been absorbed and how much has been blocked.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section II, the disaster traffic floods scenario and mitigation approaches will be explained, Section III will present the MILP model for the floods and mitigation approaches. Section IV discuss the results before, finally, the paper is concluded in Section V.
II. DISASTER TRAFFIC FLOODS SCENARIOS
In the post-disaster phase, a flooded node does not have the global view of the network, so it will attempt to distribute floods using its excess capacity to satisfy the maximum amount of traffic floods. If it fails then it will block the enduring or queue it. In such a case, the users will experience drops and long delays.
We will consider the normal case and alternative approaches that attempt to minimize the blocking. In these approaches, we introduce the rerouting, protection resources violation and traffic filtering that can help to absorb more floods.
A. Floods with Fixed Routing (FFR):
In the normal operation, the routing table is predetermined for the working and protection paths. In the case of increasing the traffic demands, the traffic floods will follow the same paths for each source-destination predetermined path. The traffic floods can be served using the allocated capacity plus the link residual capacity. If the capacity of the links gets fully utilized, then the floods will be blocked.
B. Floods with Selective Traffic Filtering (FSTF):
In this scenario, we suggest reducing the flood by filtering out the less important traffic. During disasters there is important traffic that should be served, such as the Voice over IP (VOIP), social media web sites, news agencies and governmental videos. On the other hand, we can find that file sharing, gaming and Video-on-Demand (VoD) traffic demands are less important and can be filtered out for a short time till the flood surge passes.
One of the issues in this scenario is how to filter out VoD traffic while allowing VOIP traffic and both of them use the Real-Time Protocol (RTP). Deep packet inspection and port filtering can be used to filter special types of traffic while allowing other types to be served.
C. Floods with Protection Paths Rerouting (FPPR):
To satisfy the huge floods, we suggest reprovisioning the protection paths that pass through the flooded node. Reprovisioning the protection paths away from the flooded node will free more capacity that can be filled by the floods without affecting the working traffic.
D. Floods with Working and Protection Paths Rerouting (FWPPR):
To serve more traffic floods, a dynamic approach is required to reprovision resources accordingly. So, next we will introduce a rerouting approach for both working and protections paths with multi-rate splitting. Here the operator has the ability to reroute everything in the network to accommodate more floods. In this scenario, we allow for multi-rate splitting as well, where the demand can be routed using multipath when it is required till the capacity is exploited.
E. Floods with Rerouting and Differentiated Services (FRDS):
In this scenario, we suggest a hybrid approach that mixes the rerouting with Diff-Serv. In Diff-Serv, the traffic is classified into protected and best-effort requests. For the protected type which is represented by high SLA commitment traffic, we keep the 1+1 protection, while for low SLA availability traffic we cancel the protection paths. Removing protection paths for low class traffic demands can free more resources that can be used to serve more traffic floods while keeping the protection for the high class traffic.
III. MILP MODEL FOR DISASTER TRAFFIC FLOODS
In this section, we present a MILP model to maximally serve traffic floods and reduce the traffic blocking and provision resources for the working and protection resources. We consider an IP over WDM network with opaque architecture, which is shown in Fig.-1 . Also multi-hop grooming will be used where the traffic is groomed at each intermediate node, and in this configuration the logical topology will be the same as the physical topology. We use such a configuration to reduce model complexity without affecting the expected results. We assume all traffic classes are protected using 1+1 dedicated path protection. In dedicated path protection, the working and protection paths should be path-disjoint.
First we design a network to accommodate the traffic plus the protection traffic, considering 1+1 means that two copies of the traffic is sent along the working and protections paths, and in the case of working path failure the destination node will switch to protection path copy. Nonetheless, the working and protection traffic (of different demands) can be multiplexed on the same wavelength.
The core network capacity should be provisioned to satisfy the maximum bandwidth requirements and commit the SLA. The SLA targets that should be met are the delay, jitter, availability and loss. Realistically, we consider the network capacity double the busy hour traffic.
The model is based on a node-link formulation, with the objective of maximizing the served traffic floods with min-hop paths for IP over WDM network architecture. The constraints are the primitive constraints for network design and routing. We add a binary parameter to represent the flooded node and another parameter to represent the flood size.
In Table-I, the parameters and variables definition.
Maximize:
Constraints (2) and (3) represent the flow conservation constraints, where the overall traffic, including the floods, is served between source and destination. The constraint itself accounts for the possibility that some demands can be blocked depending on the overall network situation. This is represented by the total traffic definition that is given by equations (4) and (5) . (4) (5) (6) Constraint (6) ensures that the total number of primary and protection wavelengths on a physical link do not exceed the available number of wavelengths on that link. (7) Equation (7) calculates the total number of used wavelengths on the physical link Constraint (8) and (9) maps the variable to its binary equivalent , while constraints (10) and (11) perform the same functionality between the variables and . M is a sufficiently big number, (10000 used in the model) and (u =10) (12) Constraint (12) ensures that the primary and backup paths are path-disjoint.
(13) Constraint (13) ensures that if a request is blocked, then its protection path is also blocked.
For the FFR scenarios, the routes are allocated statically by setting the variables ( ) to their corresponding minimum hop paths.
For the FSTF scenario, the only change is to change the blocking binary variables to be fraction numbers that range between 0 and 1, to allow for an optimal partial demand blocking. 
Parameters:
Traffic demand from node to node Number of fibers in link( m , )
Binary indicator , set if node is flooded
Represents the flood volume from node to node The number of wavelengths in a fiber
Capacity of each wavelength

Variables:
The actual demand between node and , accounting for floods The protection traffic of a demand between node and , accounting for floods The number of primary wavelength channels for demand ( ) that traverse link ( ) The number of backup wavelength channels for demand ( ) that traverse link ( m , )
Binary equivalent of , equals 1 if it has a value greater than zero.
The total number of wavelengths on a physical link Binary variable indicate whether the request is served ) or not )
Binary variable indicate whether the protection path for demand is provisioned ( or not
The model is defined as follows:
For the FPPR scenario, the protection paths can be rerouted so the only change in the model is to allow to be decided by the model, while not changing the working paths by setting to a predetermined value as a parameter.
For the FWPPR scenario, the working and protection paths can be rerouted, which is represented by the general case of the model where ( ) are both variables.
In previous scenarios, whenever a working demand get blocked its protection path will be blocked as well according to constraint (14), but for the FRDS scenario, the case is different. So we change the equality to: (14)
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND RESULTS
We evaluate the models using the NSFNET network which is shown in Fig.2 . The NSFNET covers the US and consists of 14 nodes and 21 bidirectional links. Also there are five data centers located at nodes (2, 3, 7, 8 and 9) . We used the traffic matrix, which is based on the population-factor-distance (PFD) modelling, that considers the US population and the nodes distances [10] . Also, for traffic types it adopts the cisco VNI forecast [11] .
To investigate the network performance, we apply incremental flood volumes (x2, x4, x6, x8 and x10) on a single node at a time and measure the percentage of served traffic flood for the five proposed scenarios. Fig.3 shows the percentage of average served floods for different flood sizes for the five suggested scenarios. It is obvious that for floods of up to double the traffic size it can be absorbed fully for all scenarios including the FFR, while for other flood sizes the network starts blocking demands due to capacity exhaustion. The mitigation approaches performs better than normal scenario, as they can absorb more floods and reduce the blocking. FRDS outperforms other scenarios, as the blocking does not exceed 8% for x10 whereas FFR has 33% of blocking. In the FFR approach, the fixed routing imposed on the floods stops the possibility of rerouting, leading to blocking whenever the floods exploit the available capacity. For the FSTF scenario, the network will block the online gaming, file sharing and VoD that accounts 40% of the whole traffic [10] to allow other important traffic to be served. Eventually, instead of blocking the whole demand it will serve a portion of the demand until the network gets fully utilized.
In FPPR and FWPPR, the percentage of the served traffic is better than the previous two approaches because they reroute and redistribute the traffic in the network for better network utilization and less blocking. In FPPR, the working traffic will not be disrupted while the protection paths will be reprovisioned, whereas in FWPPR, everything will be disrupted to reconfigure the new routes for the working and protection traffic unless SDN technology is deployed. In SDN, the centralized controller will reroute the whole traffic demands in the network to reduce blocking, as the controller has the global view of the network.
Obviously, the FRDS has the ability to eliminate protection resources for a portion of the working traffic. So, 70% of traffic will be served as a best-effort and left to the IP layer restoration service while 30% of traffic is protected in order not to violate the SLA. The elimination of these protection resources will free resources that will be occupied by the floods. Fig.4 shows the percentage of the average blocked floods of each node for the five scenarios. We see that low traffic nodes (1, 4, 5 and 6) do not suffer from any blocking, while data center nodes blocking exceed 60%. In this work we pinpoint a new issue in disaster resilient networks. In specific, we tackled the post-disaster traffic floods in core networks. We have reviewed the possible sources for such a problem. Then we have evaluated the optical network performance under disaster traffic floods and studied how much blocking it will incur. We studied four mitigation scenarios; STF, rerouting and Diff-Serv to absorb the floods. Our approaches can be implemented by ISPs by either adopting one single approach or by combining multiple approaches depending on their existing technologies. The results show that the mitigation approaches can reduce blocking from 66% up to 15% in the worst cases. 
